The Fallacy of Our Capability to Judge Others

My Take

Bottom line: We fundamentally lack the capability to judge others objectively, yet we persist in believing our logical frameworks can determine what is "good" or "bad" for other people. This belief itself is a fallacy rooted in the subjective nature of our foundational assumptions.

Context & Background

Every day, we make judgments about others' actions, decisions, and moral worth. We evaluate whether someone's choice is "right" or "wrong," whether their behavior is "good" or "bad." This seems natural—even necessary—for navigating social relationships and building communities.

But this natural tendency masks a deeper philosophical problem: the assumption that our personal logic and moral frameworks can produce objective conclusions about others. We act as if our reasoning processes, honed by our unique experiences and perspectives, somehow grant us the authority to determine universal truths about human behavior.

This matters because these judgments shape how we treat others, what policies we support, and how we construct society itself.

The Case Against Our Judgmental Capability

The Problem with Logic-Based Judgment

We believe that applying our own logic is sufficient to conclude whether another person's judgment is objectively good or bad. But this approach contains a fundamental flaw: our conception of "right" and "wrong" cannot be objective unless it rests on truly objective foundations.

Logic is a powerful tool, but it operates on premises. When we judge others, we're not just applying neutral reasoning—we're applying reasoning built upon our own assumptions about what matters, what constitutes harm, what defines flourishing, and what purposes life should serve.

The Axiom Problem

Even when we try to ground our judgments in established axioms—those seemingly self-evident truths—we encounter another layer of subjectivity. What we consider "self-evident" is itself a choice shaped by perspective.

Take mathematics, often considered the most objective domain of human knowledge. Even mathematical axioms, those foundational assumptions we treat as obviously true, are based on a particular "perspective" or "direction" from which we choose to view mathematical reality. The axiom of choice, the parallel postulate in geometry, or the law of excluded middle in logic—these aren't discovered truths but chosen frameworks that prove useful for certain purposes.

If even mathematics requires subjective choices about foundational assumptions, how much more subjective are our moral and ethical frameworks?

The Selection of Self-Evidence

When we declare something "self-evident," we're making a deeply personal choice about what deserves the status of foundational truth. This selection process reflects our cultural background, personal experiences, emotional makeup, and countless other factors that vary dramatically between individuals.

What feels obviously true to me may feel obviously false to you—not because one of us is more logical, but because we're starting from different foundational assumptions about reality, value, and purpose.

The Paradoxical Questions

This analysis leads us to a series of increasingly puzzling questions:

Can I really judge what is good or bad for another person? If my judgments rest on subjective foundations, then my conclusions about others' choices reflect my own perspective more than any objective truth about their situation.

Are we, as humans, capable of judging others at all? Perhaps the very act of judgment requires a god's-eye view that finite, perspective-bound creatures like ourselves simply cannot achieve.

Is there an escape from this limitation? Here we encounter the deepest paradox: the only perspective that might be "capable" of breaking through the fallacy of our judgmental capability is the belief that each person is the most qualified judge of their own situation—that they are making the judgment that's best for themselves.

The Paradox of Perspective-Dependent Truth

But this solution creates its own puzzle. If we accept that each person is best positioned to judge their own situation, we're still making a judgment—a meta-judgment about the nature of judgment itself. We're claiming that "believing people know what's best for themselves" is the correct perspective for seeing the "direction" of right and wrong.

This leads to a recursive problem: we escape one form of judgmental fallacy only by embracing another. We solve the problem of judging others by judging that we shouldn't judge others—which is still a judgment.

Addressing Counter-Arguments

"But some judgments are clearly correct"

It's tempting to point to extreme cases where our judgments seem obviously valid—cases involving clear harm, violence, or injustice. But even these cases involve complex questions about values, circumstances, and consequences that we may not fully understand from our external perspective.

This doesn't mean all actions are equally valid, but rather that our confidence in our judgments may be systematically overrated.

"Society requires shared standards"

True, functional societies need shared norms and standards. But acknowledging the limitation of our judgmental capability doesn't eliminate the need for social coordination. Instead, it might lead us to hold our shared standards more humbly, with greater openness to revision and greater respect for those who experience them differently.

What This Means Going Forward

Recognizing this fallacy doesn't lead to moral nihilism or paralysis. Instead, it suggests several important shifts in how we approach judgment:

• Epistemic humility: Holding our moral judgments more lightly, recognizing their provisional nature
• Increased curiosity: Seeking to understand others' perspectives rather than immediately evaluating them
• Focus on harm reduction: Concentrating on preventing clear harms rather than optimizing for our vision of the good life
• Procedural over substantive justice: Emphasizing fair processes over predetermined outcomes

I Could Be Wrong

This entire argument might itself be a product of my own limited perspective. Perhaps there are objective moral truths that can be discerned through reason, tradition, or divine revelation. Perhaps the very fact that I can recognize the limitation of my perspective somehow transcends that limitation.

What might change my mind would be a compelling demonstration of truly objective moral knowledge—knowledge that doesn't ultimately rest on contestable assumptions about human nature, the purpose of existence, or the nature of value itself.

Conclusion

The fallacy of our capability to judge others reveals a deep paradox in human moral reasoning. We cannot escape the need to make judgments, yet we cannot ground those judgments in truly objective foundations. Perhaps wisdom lies not in resolving this paradox but in learning to live thoughtfully within it—making necessary judgments while remaining humble about their ultimate validity.

This raises the ultimate question: if we cannot judge others objectively, and if even the principle that "people know what's best for themselves" is itself a judgment, what foundation remains for moral discourse? Perhaps the answer is not to find a foundation, but to learn to build meaning and community on the acknowledgment of groundlessness itself.

Discussion: What do you think? Can we ever escape our own perspective enough to judge others fairly? Or is the very attempt to do so a form of intellectual hubris? I'd love to hear your thoughts on this philosophical puzzle.

About this piece: This exploration arose from thinking about the confidence with which we often judge others' choices, despite our own limited and perspective-bound understanding of their situations and values.