企查查IPO"圈钱"四问：账上17亿，却要股民再掏15亿

企查查拟登陆上交所主板。它账上货币性资产约 17亿元，一年净赚 3亿多，却要向公众募资 15亿元，且不设"补充流动资金"，全部包装成"研发升级"。可把招股书拆开看，这15亿的必要性经不起推敲——以下四点，数字自己会说话。

一、名为"募15亿搞研发"，实为让股民替它发工资、买楼

这15亿"搞研发"的钱，"人员投入"就高达 6.02亿元，占四成；仅C端、B端两个项目的人员投入就合计 4.38亿元，而招股书白纸黑字写明，这两个项目"以现有在职人员为主"。换言之，约 4.4亿元是发给早已在职、公司本就在给发工资的人——而企查查全年工资总额也不过约 2.5亿元，这笔募资相当于让股民替它把全公司工资发两年多。真正像研发的设备投入只有 4.5亿元，且其中 3.85亿元全砸在"AI项目"一个篮子里，另外三个"研发项目"的设备加起来不到 0.7亿元。此外还有约 2亿元是按人头算面积去"买办公楼、做装修"——可企查查早在 2023年就已建成自己的总部大楼，约 3.6万平方米、自建自有、耗资约 3亿元，如今只装着约 639名员工，人均办公面积近 56平方米，是普通写字楼的三四倍，这座刚落成两年的自有大楼显然远未坐满。一边是空着大半、还是自己掏钱盖的新楼，一边却要再花股民 2亿元去买楼装修，与当年"六成募资买房"被否的中智股份如出一辙。

二、增长已停、还在裁员，却要股民多掏6亿"养人"——向监管提供虚假、误导性信息

招股书自称"已以自有资金预先进行部分投入"，潜台词是"我有能力、也已在自己出钱做研发和AI"。可财报处处打脸：唯一像样的硬投入——AI项目号称要花 3.85亿元买设备——公司却几乎没动用自有资金去买，反而把钱越囤越多，理财（交易性金融资产）从2023年的 4.1亿元 涨到2025年年中的 16.0亿元，两年多多囤约 12亿元。更要命的是，企查查增长明显放缓、被指逼近天花板，员工人数也早已停涨，从2023年的 651人 降到2024年的 610人，公司自认在"优化"（裁减）技术、研发、销售人员。一家增长停滞、还在裁员的公司，却要股民多掏 6亿元去"养更多人"。更讽刺的是，募资的重头恰恰是AI——AI本就是用来替代人力的，企查查大量的数据采集、清洗、客服、采编岗位，正是AI最该砍掉的；一边花3.85亿买AI设备、喊着"降本增效"，一边又要6亿去多雇人，逻辑自相矛盾。说一套、做一套：嘴上自掏腰包投研发，账上却囤16亿、裁研发、几乎一分自有资金不投，转身向股民要15亿。在批评者看来，这近乎是对监管与公众的一个谎言——自己的16亿原封不动躺在账上，却要公众来替它出这笔钱。更严重的是，招股书以"募资投研发"为必要理由，却与它囤16亿、裁研发的实际行为直接相悖；《证券法》明确，招股书存在虚假记载或误导性陈述即属信息披露违法。据此，企查查此举已涉嫌向监管提供虚假、误导性信息——触碰的是发行人如实披露的红线，早已不是"这15亿怎么花"那么简单。

三、账上现金比募资还多，同类"不差钱还募资"的都已被终止

它账上的现金本就比要募的钱还多。这样"不差钱还要募资"的公司，前车之鉴一个个都已被终止：

连账上96亿、60亿的公司都被挡在门外，账上17亿、却仍要募15亿的企查查，凭什么例外？

四、上市前突击分红，同类"先分红再闯关"的都已被终止

上市前，它还突击分红 3亿元，实控人陈德强一人拿走约 1.45亿元。而同样"先分红、再闯关"的公司，也一个接一个倒下：

一家账上趴着17亿、一年净赚3亿、却还在裁研发的公司，要股民再掏15亿去"投研发、发工资、买楼"。同样的剧本，前辈们一个接一个倒在了发审门口。企查查真正该回答的，从来不是"这15亿怎么花"，而是——你自己的16亿，为什么一分不掏？

（说明：本文基于公开披露——招股说明书、上交所审核问询回复报告——撰写；"过度融资/误导"系对披露数据的批评性解读，非监管定性结论。截至成文，企查查IPO仍处上交所审核阶段。）

Four Questions on Qichacha's IPO "Cash Grab": 1.7 Billion in the Bank, Yet Asking Investors for Another 1.5 Billion

Qichacha plans to list on the Main Board of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. It has roughly 1.7 billion yuan in monetary assets on its books and nets over 300 million yuan a year, yet it wants to raise 1.5 billion yuan from the public—with no "replenishment of working capital" line item, the whole sum packaged as "R&D upgrades." But pull the prospectus apart, and the case for that 1.5 billion doesn't hold up. On the following four points, the numbers speak for themselves.

1. Billed as "1.5 billion to fund R&D," it actually has investors pay its payroll and buy its office building

Of this 1.5 billion supposedly "for R&D," 602 million yuan—40%—is "personnel investment." The C-end and B-end projects alone account for a combined 438 million yuan in personnel investment, yet the prospectus states in black and white that these two projects rely "primarily on existing on-staff employees." In other words, about 440 million yuan goes to people already on the payroll, whom the company is already paying—while Qichacha's total annual wage bill is only about 250 million yuan. This raising is tantamount to having investors cover the entire company's wages for more than two years. Equipment investment—the part that actually looks like R&D—is only 450 million yuan, and 385 million of that is all dumped into one basket, the "AI project"; the equipment for the other three "R&D projects" combined comes to less than 70 million yuan. On top of that, about 200 million yuan is allocated—on a per-head floor-area basis—to "buying an office building and doing the fit-out." But Qichacha already completed its own headquarters building back in 2023: about 36,000 square meters, self-built and self-owned, at a cost of around 300 million yuan, now housing only about 639 employees—nearly 56 square meters of office space per person, three to four times that of an ordinary office block. This self-owned building, only two years old, is plainly nowhere near full. On one hand, a new building it paid to construct itself sits more than half empty; on the other, it wants to spend another 200 million yuan of investors' money to buy and fit out office space—exactly the playbook of CITIC Human Resources, whose bid was rejected when "60% of the raise was going to buy property."

1. Growth has stalled and it's laying people off, yet it wants investors to hand over another 600 million to "keep people employed"—raising the suspicion of misleading the regulator and the public

The prospectus claims it "has already made partial investments in advance using its own funds"—the subtext being "I have the means, and I'm already spending my own money on R&D and AI." But the financials contradict it at every turn: the one hard investment that looks the part—the AI project, said to require 385 million yuan of equipment—the company has barely touched its own funds to pay for. Instead it has piled up more and more cash, with wealth-management holdings (trading financial assets) rising from 410 million yuan at the end of 2023 to 1.6 billion yuan by mid-2025—an additional hoard of about 1.2 billion yuan in two-and-a-half years. Worse still, Qichacha's growth has clearly slowed and is said to be nearing its ceiling, and its headcount stopped rising long ago, falling from 651 people in 2023 to 610 people in 2024, with the company itself acknowledging it is "optimizing" (cutting) technical, R&D, and sales staff. A company whose growth has stalled and that is laying people off nonetheless wants investors to hand over another 600 million yuan to "employ more people." More ironic still, the centerpiece of the raise is precisely AI—AI being exactly what replaces human labor. Qichacha's many data-collection, data-cleaning, customer-service, and content-gathering roles are precisely the ones AI should cut. Spending 385 million on AI equipment while shouting "cut costs, boost efficiency," and at the same time asking for 600 million to hire more people, is self-contradictory. It says one thing and does another: professing to fund R&D out of its own pocket, while its books show 1.6 billion hoarded, R&D staff cut, and barely a cent of its own money invested—then turning to investors for 1.5 billion. To critics, this comes close to a lie to the regulator and the public—its own 1.6 billion sits untouched on the books, yet it asks the public to foot the bill instead. More seriously, the prospectus cites "raising funds to invest in R&D" as its essential justification, yet this directly contradicts its actual conduct of hoarding 1.6 billion and cutting R&D; the Securities Law is explicit that a prospectus containing false records or misleading statements constitutes an information-disclosure violation. On that basis, Qichacha's move already raises the suspicion of providing false and misleading information to the regulator—it touches the red line of an issuer's duty to disclose truthfully, and is long past being as simple as "how to spend this 1.5 billion."

1. It holds more cash than it wants to raise, and comparable "not short of money yet still raising" cases have already been terminated

The cash on its books already exceeds the money it wants to raise. Companies like this—"not short of money yet still raising"—have one cautionary precedent after another, all already terminated:

If even companies with 9.6 billion and 6.0 billion on their books were shut out, what makes Qichacha—with 1.7 billion on hand yet still seeking 1.5 billion—the exception?

1. A last-minute dividend before listing, and comparable "dividend first, then run the gauntlet" cases have all been terminated

Right before listing, it also rushed through a 300 million yuan dividend, with controlling shareholder Chen Deqiang alone taking about 145 million yuan. And companies that likewise went "dividend first, then run the gauntlet" have fallen one after another:

A company sitting on 1.7 billion, netting 300 million a year, yet still cutting R&D, wants investors to hand over another 1.5 billion to "invest in R&D, pay wages, and buy a building." Same script—and its predecessors fell, one after another, at the gates of the issuance review. The question Qichacha really ought to answer has never been "how will this 1.5 billion be spent," but rather: your own 1.6 billion—why won't you spend a cent of it?

(Note: This article is based on public disclosures—the prospectus and the Shanghai Stock Exchange's review inquiry-response reports; "over-financing/misleading" is a critical interpretation of the disclosed data, not a regulatory determination. As of writing, Qichacha's IPO remains under review at the Shanghai Stock Exchange.)