The internet is often described as two distinct worlds.
There is the clearnet, the visible and supposedly regulated portion of the internet that we access through conventional browsers and search engines.
Then there is the dark web, commonly portrayed as a hidden, anonymous, and inherently dangerous corner of the internet.
This distinction is useful for describing how websites are accessed, but it becomes misleading when it is treated as a distinction between safe and unsafe.
The term clearnet only describes "visibility" and "accessibility". It does not describe security.
A website being indexed by a search engine does not mean that it has been verified. A familiar domain does not guarantee that its infrastructure is secure. A padlock in the browser does not mean that a website is legitimate. In fact, many of the mechanisms that make the modern web convenient also create opportunities for tracking, fraud, exploitation, and malware delivery.
The clearnet is not inherently dangerous. But neither is it inherently safe.
Visibility ≠ Security
The clearnet generally refers to the portion of the web that is publicly accessible through standard browsers and conventional search engines. The dark web, by contrast, consists of services that are intentionally inaccessible through ordinary web infrastructure and commonly require specialized software such as Tor.
The distinction is technical, not a security classification. Yet users routinely make an assumption that goes beyond the technical definition:
"if a website is visible, indexed, and operating openly, it must have passed some form of security or legitimacy check lol 🤓."
But guess what .... It has not.
Search engines index "content". They are not security auditors. A website can appear prominently in search results while simultaneously being fraudulent, compromised, or actively malicious.
This creates a form of legitimacy bias. Users tend to associate visibility with trustworthiness.
Attackers understand this.
The clearnet contains the overwhelming majority of internet users , which makes it an attractive environment for phishing, malware distribution, credential theft, and other forms of cybercrime.
Phishing, for example, appears in a significant proportion of modern data breaches and remains one of the most common initial attack vectors.
The Padlock Was Never a Safety Certificate
One of the most persistent misconceptions surrounding web security is the browser padlock.
The padlock indicates that the connection between the user's browser and the website is encrypted using HTTPS. That is important. It protects data while it is being transmitted between the browser and the destination.
But it does not tell you whether the destination itself is legitimate.
A phishing website can obtain a valid TLS certificate and display the same padlock as a legitimate banking website. The connection can be fully encrypted while the user is sending their username and password directly to an attacker.
HTTPS provides confidentiality and integrity for the connection. It does not establish the identity or trustworthiness of the person operating the website. A convincing phishing page can therefore satisfy the technical requirements necessary to display a padlock while remaining completely malicious.
The Malware Delivery Infrastructure
Malware does not need to arrive from an obviously suspicious website.
The modern web contains a complex ecosystem of advertising networks, analytics platforms, third-party scripts, content management systems, plugins, embedded services, and external resources. A user may interact with only one website while their browser communicates with dozens of other systems in the background. This creates an extensive supply chain.
Legitimate websites frequently rely on third-party advertising networks to monetize their traffic. While this is a normal part of the modern web economy, it also introduces additional infrastructure that the website operator does not necessarily control directly.
Attackers can abuse advertising systems to distribute malicious content through otherwise legitimate websites. This practice, commonly known as malvertising, can place malicious advertisements in front of users who have no intention of visiting a suspicious website.
The danger is not always obvious. A user could be reading a news article, browsing a sports website, or checking business hours while third-party content is being loaded in the background. The website itself may be legitimate. One of its external dependencies may not be.
Your Browser Is Part of the Attack Surface
The security of a website is only one component of web security. The browser itself is another.
Modern browsers are designed primarily around usability.JavaScript is enabled by default, multimedia content works without additional configuration, websites can store information locally, extensions can modify browser behavior, and third-party services can interact with pages.
These features make the modern web functional. They also increase the browser's attack surface.
Tor Browser provides an interesting contrast because its security model is designed around privacy and resistance to tracking. Its security levels can restrict JavaScript, third-party content, and other browser functionality. The Safest profile disables JavaScript, while the Standard profile permits it by default.
At the lowest level, the attack surface exists because JavaScript is not interpreted in isolation. A script supplied by a remote website is passed through a chain of highly complex native subsystems, including the JavaScript engine, JIT compiler, DOM implementation, rendering pipeline, WebAssembly runtime, networking stack, image and media decoders, and graphics interfaces. Many of these components process attacker-controlled data and have historically contained memory-safety vulnerabilities such as use-after-free, type confusion, out-of-bounds access, and integer overflow. Malicious JavaScript can therefore act as the trigger for a vulnerability in native browser code, transforming an otherwise sand-boxed web-page into a mechanism for manipulating the browser's internal memory state.
A typical exploitation path begins with a vulnerability in the JavaScript engine or another renderer component. For example, a type-confusion flaw can cause optimized JIT-generated code to operate on an object using an incorrect internal type assumption. If that assumption can be influenced by attacker-controlled input, subsequent operations may access memory outside the intended object boundary. An attacker may then attempt to turn this primitive into a more useful capability, such as controlled memory disclosure or arbitrary memory modification. Information disclosure can potentially reveal internal addresses and weaken protections such as ASLR, while sufficiently powerful memory corruption may allow manipulation of control-flow data or other security-sensitive structures. Modern engines employ mitigations such as pointer compression, control-flow protections, heap isolation, JIT hardening, and sandboxing to make these transitions substantially more difficult.
Even successful code execution inside a renderer does not normally provide unrestricted access to the host operating system. Chromium-based browsers, for example, isolate web content in restricted renderer processes and rely on a more privileged browser process for sensitive operations. An attacker who compromises the renderer therefore encounters another security boundary: the browser sandbox. A complete browser-to-host compromise may require an additional vulnerability capable of escaping that sandbox and reaching a more privileged process, potentially followed by further exploitation to obtain operating-system-level privileges. The resulting chain can be represented as:
Attacker-controlled JavaScript → Engine/renderer vulnerability → Memory-corruption primitive → Renderer code execution → Sandbox escape → Privileged process → Host compromise
This layered architecture is why browser exploitation is technically difficult, but also why a seemingly ordinary webpage can represent a meaningful security risk when multiple vulnerabilities are successfully chained.
Learn more about The OPSEC Problem With JavaScript
Scammers Move Faster Than Takedowns
The clearnet has systems for reporting and removing malicious websites. These systems are valuable, but they are fundamentally reactive. A fraudulent domain can be registered quickly and cheaply, and once it is reported and removed, an attacker can establish another domain and continue operating. This creates an asymmetric problem: defenders must identify the malicious infrastructure, investigate it, submit or process a takedown request, and wait for the relevant infrastructure provider to act, while attackers only need another domain. As a result, malicious infrastructure can remain operational long enough to achieve its objective even if it is eventually removed.
Checkout : Phishing Statistics
Search Results Are not Always Verified
There is another psychological component to this problem. Users tend to trust what they find through familiar interfaces.
A result appearing on a search engine feels more legitimate than an unfamiliar link received through an unsolicited message. An advertisement displayed on a major social platform feels more trustworthy than a random website.
Neither assumption is reliable. Search engines and social platforms use automated systems to identify fraudulent content, but malicious actors continuously adapt their domains, advertisements, wording, payment infrastructure, and delivery methods.
The existence of a detection system does not mean that every malicious resource has already been detected. This is why a website's presence in a search engine should not be interpreted as a security endorsement.
Indexing means that a search engine knows the resource exists. It does not mean that someone has certified it as safe.
Learn more about SEO Poisoning
Privacy is an Illusion
There is another reason the idea of a “monitored” clearnet can be misleading: monitoring does not necessarily mean protection. The modern web relies heavily on analytics, advertising networks, cookies, tracking pixels, and fingerprinting to collect information about user behavior. Users may therefore be highly visible, measurable, and profiled while receiving little meaningful protection from malicious actors. This data can support advertising, personalization, and commercial targeting, while also becoming valuable information for attackers. As noted in the original draft, the HTTP Archive’s 2025 Privacy chapter indicates that a large majority of webpages contain third-party tracking technologies. Surveillance and security are therefore not interchangeable concepts.
The clearnet is not inherently more malicious than the dark web. The difference often lies in the user's threat model and behavior. Most clearnet users browse assuming the environment is trustworthy: they leave JavaScript enabled, install extensions, accept third-party content, reuse familiar browsing profiles, and rely on indicators such as the padlock or search ranking. Users who perceive their environment as hostile tend to behave differently, isolating sessions, restricting browser functionality, disabling unnecessary scripts, minimizing extensions, and treating unfamiliar infrastructure with greater suspicion.
The broader lesson applies regardless of where browsing occurs. Security is not a property granted by a URL or network category. It is the result of secure software, careful configuration, threat awareness, and user behavior. A monitored environment can still be unsafe, while a less trusted environment can become significantly safer when users understand and actively manage their threat model.
What Users Can Actually Do
The clearnet is where people communicate, work, study, shop, access financial services, read news, and interact with public institutions. The objective should be to stop treating convenience features as security guarantees.
Users can reduce their exposure by:
- Keeping browsers and operating systems updated.
- Minimizing unnecessary browser extensions.
- Blocking unwanted third-party tracking where practical.
- Using separate browser profiles or containers for different activities.
- Restricting JavaScript when it is not required, particularly on high-risk websites.
- Treating unsolicited links and advertisements with skepticism.
- Checking domains carefully before entering credentials.
- Using password managers and unique passwords for important accounts.
- Enabling multi-factor authentication where available.
- Understanding what HTTPS does and does not guarantee.
- Avoiding the assumption that search ranking equals legitimacy.
These measures do not make someone invulnerable. They change the economics of an attack by reducing unnecessary exposure and making common attack techniques more difficult to execute.
Conclusion
The word "clear" in clearnet describes visibility. It does not describe safety.
A website can be indexed, encrypted, professionally designed, heavily trafficked, and completely legitimate while still exposing users to tracking or third-party risks. Conversely, a malicious website can possess a valid HTTPS certificate, appear in search results, and look almost identical to a legitimate service.
The most important security boundary is often much closer to the user: the browser, the operating system, the credentials being entered, the permissions being granted, and the assumptions being made.
The clearnet is a remarkable piece of infrastructure. It is a global library, marketplace, communication platform, and public square.
It is also a massive target.So Users should not navigate it with the assumption that visibility means safety. They should navigate it with hardened configurations, operational awareness, and persistent skepticism.
The clearnet is not as clear as commonly believed.
