There is a tempting story in agent infrastructure:
Agents use tools. Tools are dangerous. Therefore every company deploying agents will need a policy layer.
That story is too broad.
The agent control problem only becomes a large standalone market in one world:
Agents must become dynamic consumers of external services that teams did not fully pre-wrap themselves.
Today, the concrete insertion point for that world is MCP. Tomorrow it may be broader than MCP. But the dependency is the same: the agent has to be using services that the engineering team did not already collapse into safe internal rails.
Two architectures, two outcomes
The market comes down to one divide: hard-wired agents versus dynamic agents.
The hard-wired world
In the hard-wired world, developers build specific workflows with specific internal functions:
internal_process_refund()rotate_staging_secret()create_customer_credit()
They put validation, approvals, and business logic inside those functions. The agent does not get raw access to dangerous capabilities. It gets curated rails.
In that world, a generic control layer is useful, but it is much more likely to be a feature than a company.
The dynamic world
In the dynamic world, agents are given goals and a changing set of services. They discover tools at runtime. They consume third-party MCP servers. They use services another team introduced yesterday. They combine tools in ways the original developer did not fully script.
In that world, a separate control layer starts to matter a lot more.
The engineering team cannot realistically wrap every future service the agent may decide to use. The system needs a boundary between autonomous reasoning and external execution.
That is the world we are building for.
Why most broad agent-security stories are wrong
A lot of "AI agent security" messaging quietly assumes that every dangerous action will remain exposed as a raw tool call forever.
That is not how serious teams operate.
If a company knows it wants an agent to issue refunds, it will usually build a safe internal refund action. If it wants an agent to manage infrastructure, it will usually expose a constrained internal workflow, not a pile of raw cloud primitives.
This matters because it narrows the real market for a proxy like Intercept.
The credible story is not:
"We secure all agent tool calls everywhere."
The credible story is:
"We give teams a policy boundary when agents use services the team did not fully pre-wrap."
That is much narrower. It is also much more believable.
The three needs that still survive
Even in a world where teams wrap many of their own dangerous actions, three needs remain.
1. The policy hub
Companies do not want to rebuild the same approval, audit, and rate-limit logic in every wrapper and every service.
If legal changes a threshold from $100 to $50, that should not require edits across 20 repositories.
This is the internal consistency case for a separate policy layer.
2. The untrusted third party
This is the cleanest wedge.
You can wrap your own code. You cannot wrap a third-party MCP server.
If a team wants an agent to use an external market-research server, a procurement server, a travel server, or a vendor-owned integration, it does not control the internal logic of that service. It still needs a way to decide:
- should the agent be allowed to use this service at all?
- which tools are permitted?
- what needs approval?
- what should be logged?
This is where a proxy starts to earn its keep.
3. Meta-governance
Stripe can govern Stripe. AWS can govern AWS. A payment rail can govern its own spend limits.
But who governs the agent's total impact across all of them?
Who gives you:
- one approval model
- one audit trail
- one shared rate policy
- one aggregate view of operational risk
That is the higher-order control problem above any single provider.
Why MCP matters right now
MCP is not the entire thesis, but it is the current insertion point.
It gives agents a standard way to talk to services. That makes it easier to connect more things, faster. It also creates the exact governance gap that many teams have not solved yet: once a service is reachable through MCP, what controls the agent's actual use of it?
That is the problem Intercept is built to address.
The point is not that MCP itself is unsafe. The point is that connectivity standards and control standards are different things. Protocols make access easier. They do not automatically make access governable.
What would limit this market
This thesis is not proven yet.
The market stays smaller than many people expect if most teams tell us some version of:
- "We only let agents use a handful of internal tools we built ourselves."
- "We will never let agents discover services at runtime."
- "We already wrapped every important action."
- "This is a nice local dev safeguard, but we would never put it in a real workflow."
If that is the dominant reality, then agent control is a narrower market than many people want to admit.
Signals this market is becoming real
The strongest signal is not GitHub stars or local experimentation. It is teams saying:
- "We cannot predict every service the agent will reach."
- "We need approvals and audit on top of third-party tools."
- "We want a policy layer above our wrappers."
- "We would run this in shadow mode or enforcement on a real workflow."
That is what a real market looks like.
Where we stand
The current market is real, but early.
There are already developers connecting Claude Code, Cursor, and custom agents to GitHub, Postgres, Stripe, cloud tooling, and external MCP servers. That is enough to make the problem visible.
What is not yet proven is whether this becomes a broad production need or remains a narrower edge case around experimental and semi-structured workflows.
So the honest position is:
- the problem is real
- the architecture is coherent
- the market could become large
- but it only gets large if agents become dynamic consumers of external services
That is the bet.
Why we're building Intercept
Intercept is our view of what the control layer should look like today:
- sit in the MCP path
- scan what the agent can actually reach
- generate a starting policy
- enforce before execution
- require approval for sensitive actions
- log every decision
If the world stays hard-wired, that may remain a useful product in a limited market.
If the world turns dynamic, this control layer stops being optional.
That is the line we are watching.
If you are building agents that use third-party MCP services or dynamic service discovery, we want to talk. The interesting question is not whether the idea sounds right. It is whether your architecture is already forcing you to solve this problem.
